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We develop and test a model of mortgage underwriting, with par-
ticular reference to the role of generic credit bureau scores. In our
model, scores are used in a standardized fashion, which reﬂects the
prevalence of automated underwriting in industry practice. We show
that our model has implicationsfor the debate on the eﬀect of personal
bankruptcy exemptions on secured lending.
Recent literature has developed conﬂicting theories — and found
conﬂicting results — seeking to explain how exemptions aﬀect the
mortgage market. By contrast, in our model exemptions are actually
irrelevant to the mortgage underwriting decision. Instead, our model
suggests that since exemptions are correlated with credit scores, some
of the previous works ﬁndings of signiﬁcant eﬀects for exemptions may
rather reﬂect a failure to fully control for creditworthiness. Merging
data from a major credit bureau with the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) data set, we conﬁrm these predictions of our model.
Keywords: Personal Bankruptcy, Mortgage Underwriting, Credit
Scores
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G33, J41, K12, O57.
2I Introduction
We develop and test a model of mortgage underwriting, highlighting an im-
portant feature of real-world underwriting: the use of generic credit bureau
scores to infer an applicant’s inherent quality. In our model mortgage lenders
use credit scores in a standardized fashion, in that they apply a formula that
does not take into account the special circumstances or geographic varia-
tion that might inﬂuence a particular score. We estimate our model and
determine the impact that credit bureau scores have on the likelihood that
a mortgage application will be approved.
Our theoretical predictions and empirical results also stand in contrast
to recent work on the eﬀect of bankruptcy exemptions on the availability of
mortgage credit, in particular Berkowitz and Hynes [1] (henceforth BH) and
Lin and White [2]. These papers develop conﬂicting models in which lenders
condition underwriting decisions on exemptions; both papers also ﬁnd sup-
port for their respective hypotheses in the HMDA data. While the previous
literature models exemptions as directly aﬀecting the mortgage market, we
argue that they are actually irrelevant to the mortgage underwriting deci-
sion. We conﬁrm this empirically and also show that some of the results of
the previous literature may be explained by its not accounting for lenders’
use of generic credit bureau scores.
By “generic credit bureau scores,” we mean the scores which are akin to
those commonly known as “FICO” scores, which are produced by each of
the three major credit bureaus in conjuction with Fair Isaac (rather than
custom-designed mortgage scores). That these scores play a critical role in
the mortgage underwriting process is indisputable; for example, Temkin et
al. [3] document that the use of these generic scores for underwriting purposes
is widespread throughout the industry. And although lenders and underwrit-
ers assert that individuals are not rejected solely on the basis of poor scores,
3it is well known that a low score makes it almost impossible to obtain a prime
mortgage. For example, a score below 620 is considered evidence by Fred-
die Mac that the “borrower’s credit reputation [is] probably not acceptable”;
Fannie Mae similarly advises that in such a case “there must be...extenuating
circumstances” (see Temkin et al. [3]). The key factor driving the use of these
scores – and, signiﬁcantly, the standardized way in which they are used — is
the increasing prevalence of automated underwriting. Automated underwrit-
ing itself has been strongly promoted by the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac), which pool mortgage loans for sale on the secondary market.1
We are, of course, not the ﬁrst to note that borrower creditworthiness is
an important factor in evaluating mortgage applications. Indeed, a desire to
account for creditworthinesswas one of the primary drivers behind the Boston
Fed Study on mortgage discrimination (see Munnell et al. [5]). Two recent
papers are also noteworthy for incorporating credit scores into an empirical
examination of the mortgage market: Barakova et al. [6] and Pennington-
Cross and Nichols [7].
As we have already mentioned, an important aspect of our model is its
implication for the debate on the role of bankruptcy exemptions in the mort-
gage market. The dramatic rise in personal bankruptcy ﬁlings over the past
two decades has motivated research into the eﬀect of bankruptcy laws on
consumer credit markets. Particular attention has been devoted to the ef-
fect of the bankruptcy exemptions, which diﬀer quite dramatically across
states, and vocal lobbies have proposed reforming these laws and making
them more uniform. These exemptions govern the assets which a ﬁler can
retain in bankruptcy; although rather detailed intricate in practice,2 they
are often broken down into two broad categories: homestead exemptions (the
1For more on automated underwriting, see Straka [4].
2For example, Oklahoma law exempts 100 chickens, ﬁve dairy cows and calves under
six months, ten hogs, two horses, 20 sheep and feed to last one year.
4amount of home equity which can be retained in a bankruptcy ﬁling) and
personal property exemptions (other assets). Several studies have found that
higher exemptions make borrowers more likely to ﬁle for bankruptcy; see,
for example, Fay, Hurst, and White [8].3 Furthermore, Gropp, Scholz, and
White [10] have shown that more generous bankruptcy laws also make it
more diﬃcult for consumers to obtain credit.
This research has been undertaken in the context of unsecured credit,
where bankruptcy exemptions can be reasonably hypothesized to have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the default decision. By contrast, the eﬀect of these
exemptions on secured credit and, in particular, home mortgages (the most
common such form of credit) is far less clear. The reason is that when lend-
ing is secured, the creditor has preferential access to the collateral and so
exemptions would seem to play only a minor role at best.4
BH argue (as do we) that since mortgages are secured, their performance
should be relatively unaﬀected by exemption levels. They further suggest
that, in fact, there may be cases where higher exemptions can actually ben-
eﬁt the mortgage lender. In particular, they argue that higher homestead
exemptions should reduce the incidence of mortgage default because they
leave the borrower with more wealth after a bankruptcy ﬁling, which may
help him continue repaying his mortgage in the future. This is easiest to
see in the case of a chapter 13 ﬁling. Since the payments a debtor makes in
chapter 13 must be at least as large as they would have been under chapter
7, more generous exemptions make it easier to qualify for chapter 13.5 This
facilitates the ﬁler’s retaining his home because under chapter 13, mortgage
3Note, however, that other work has not found a signiﬁcant impact from exemptions,
especially when using state-level (rather than individual) data; see Kowalewski [9].
4Furthermore, in the case of mortgages, deﬁciency judgments (in which amounts above
the collateral value become unsecured debts subject to exemptions) are often prohibited.
511 U.S.C. §1325(a)(4). The other condition is that “all of the debtor’s projected
disposable income...will be applied to make payments under the plan.” (11 U.S.C.
§1325(b)(1)(B)).
5payments can be deducted before calculating the “disposable income” (which
must be turned over under the repayment plan). By contrast, for personal
property exemptions, the sign is indeterminate because the positive “wealth
eﬀect” may be counterbalanced by a negative eﬀect due to increased pro-
tection from deﬁciency judgments;6 since lenders anticipate this protection,
they may be less likely to lend. BH then examine the HMDA data and ﬁnd
support for the hypothesis that higher homestead exemptions lead to less
restrictive terms on mortgage loans, i.e., a lower likelihood of being denied a
mortgage. They also ﬁnd that personal property exemptions do not have a
statistically signiﬁcant impact.7
By contrast, Lin and White [2] (henceforth LW) develop a model that
leads them to the opposite conclusion, viz., that higher exemptions should
result in a tightening of the terms of credit. They also begin with the pre-
sumption that exemptions should not aﬀect the likelihood of mortgage de-
fault; although unlike BH, they do not have a “wealth eﬀect.”8 The thrust
of their argument is then to ﬁrst observe, as we discussed above, that higher
exemptions make personal bankruptcy more likely. They then suggest that
when a foreclosure occurs in conjunction with a bankruptcy ﬁling, it is more
costly for the lender, since it is likely to involve additional delay (because
the bankruptcy court must approve the foreclosure).9 Although the lender is
6Since the deﬁciency is unsecured, property exemptions apply.
7Some further supporting evidence for their hypothesis can also be found in Ambrose
and Capone [11], who show that defaulters with low LTVs who also ﬁle for bankruptcy
are 15% likelier to reinstate their mortgages than similar borrowers who do not ﬁle; this
suggests that some borrowers are able to use the bankruptcy process to hold on to their
homes.
8They assume that the homestead exemption is always higher than the amount due
on the mortgage, so that the exemptions are orthogonal to the question of whether the
borrower can continue paying the mortgage.
9By contrast, BH argue that a bankruptcy may actually facilitate the foreclosure pro-
cess. The arguments on both sides of this issue are somewhat diﬃcult to resolve, but
Springer and Waller [12] do present some empirical evidence that conﬁrms that bankruptcy
lengthens the foreclosure process; indeed, they ﬁnd that it doubles it (to six months on av-
6entitled to collect additional interest to compensate him for this delay,10 the
available assets may well not be suﬃcient to pay this interest, nor will these
additional payments necessarily fully compensate the lender for all associated
costs. As a result, they conclude that higher exemptions should lead to more
rationing in the mortgage market, not because they aﬀect the probability of
default but rather because they increase the loss given default. They then
test their hypothesis on the HMDA data (using a diﬀerent time period than
BH) and ﬁnd evidence to support their hypothesis.
We will show that our model may help explain some of these results,
because it predicts that if an econometrician were to ignore borrower credit
scores, he would ﬁnd that exemptions appear to be signiﬁcant(as LW do), but
that when creditworthiness is fully accounted for, this eﬀect disappears. As
we explain below, the reason for this is that generic credit scores are them-
selves correlated with bankruptcy exemptions, since they are based (in part)
on the performance of unsecured loans. We also document this correlation
and empirically conﬁrm the eﬀect of omitting borrower creditworthiness.11
An examination of prevailing industry practice supports our contention
that exemptions do not ﬁgure in the underwriting process. From the afore-
mentioned Temkin study, as well as the documentation the GSEs themselves
provide to support their automated underwriting systems, it is apparent that
the criteria used by the GSEs include credit scores, income, down payment,
erage). The key issue (not addressed in the literature) is whether this has an economically
signiﬁcant impact. One way to explore would be to examine the “days” measure used by
Pence [13], which is FNMA’s state-by-state estimate of the number of days required for
the foreclosure process. This does not seem to be correlated in any way with exemptions.
1011 U.S.C. 506(b); we thank Rich Hynes for bringing this to our attention.
11We should mention that another possible explanation could be that mortgage lenders
do care about exemptions, but that if political considerations militate against their use,
they compensate by placing more weight on credit scores, since, as our results imply, the
latter are correlated with exemptions (we thank Michelle White for pointing this out). A
similar argument is also often made in the context of mortgage discrimination; see Ross
and Yinger [14].
7total liabilities, and the trend of property values in the neighborhood. In
addition, special consideration is also given to individual derogatory events
such as bankruptcies. However, one factor that is never mentioned as en-
tering into their underwriting decision is bankruptcy law. Since Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac between them intermediate approximately 80% of all con-
forming mortgages, it is likely that this reﬂects prevailing industry practice.
Although individual lenders are, of course, free to use other criteria (such
as exemptions), forgoing access to automated systems is obviously costly.
One can only speculate as to why these automated systems do not account
for exemptions, but one reason may be that diﬀerentiating between states
would obviously compromise the GSEs’ attempts to form a broad political
coalition (at a time when they are subject to increasing criticism); another
reason may be that having geographically standardized criteria facilitates
loan securitization.12
The plan of the paper is as follows. We ﬁrst develop our theoretical model.
This is a model of how information on past defaults can be used to infer
borrower quality, i.e. a model of credit scoring. Given the standardized lender
behavior we have documented above, we explore our model’s implications for
the relationship between exemptions and mortgage underwriting. We then
estimate our model by imputing credit scores to the HMDA data from an
independent sample of credit bureau records. We conﬁrm that — when we
control for borrower credit score — exemptions indeed have an insigniﬁcant
eﬀect on the likelihood that a mortgage application is approved. We conclude
by showing that our model can explain some of the results of the previous
literature, which ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect from exemptions.
In our concluding remarks we also suggest that this phenomenon may be
more general and that, as credit scores are more widely applied, one may
12The latter would also apply to non-conforming loans, which are also commonly
securitized.
8expect to see more of these unintended eﬀects.
II Model
A Introduction
We begin by setting out a simple theoretical model of borrowing and repay-
ment which motivates our investigation. This model will set out relationships
between exemptions, credit scores and the mortgage market which we then
explore in the empirical work below.
Consider a borrower with a ﬁxed debt D, which is currently due; let
D ∈ [0,1]. Also suppose that he has an asset A whose value is stochastic
and can take values in [0,1] (for example, a house); to economize on notation
we will assume for simplicity that neither future lenders nor ratings agencies
can condition scores or lending decisions on past values of A, although this
is not essential. Also suppose that the borrower has a private (unobserved)
“disutility of default” K — this could be due to personal or societal mores,
or simply the cost of bankruptcy in terms of access to future credit; again,
let K ∈ [0,1]. This approach — that of individual costs of default – was
ﬁrst used by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik [15, 16]; for an application
to a mortgage market (with asymmetric information), see Brueckner [17].
For simplicity, we will assume that K<D , so that there is always the
chance (however small) that the agent will default. Finally, suppose that the
bankruptcy exemption in the borrower’s state of residence is E ∈ [0,1]. For
simplicity of exposition we combine the exemptions into a single number,
although in our estimations (below) we distinguish between homestead and
personal property exemptions.
We begin by assuming that the loan is unsecured. Then the amount of
nonexempt property that could be seized by the lender is max[0,A− E].
9Recall that the borrower also incurs an unobserved cost K from defaulting.
As a result, he will default only if
max[0,A− E]+K<D ,
where D is the amount due. Throughout this discussion we will assume
that the agent acts myopically, in that he considers the costs and beneﬁts of
defaulting only in the current period and not any impact that his behavior
might have on his future access to credit beyond the default cost K; for a
more general model which leads to similar conclusions, see Elul [18].
We can now deﬁne the notion of a credit score, denoted S. We will let
the credit score be the probability that the borrower will not default on a
generic loan in the future, given the available information (i.e., given the
borrower’s repayment history).13 In practice, although the default probabil-
ity clearly depends on E (as shown above), the model used to calculate the
credit score does not explicitly make use of geographic variables (see the Fair
Isaac “myFICO” web site [19]). This may be because of political sensitivities
(on the part of Fair Isaac) or simply because of the practical diﬃculty of do-
ing so given that approximately 2% of the U.S. population moves state every
year. Notice, however, that there is nothing preventing individual lenders
from using this information, although in practice it may be diﬃcult for them
to make a precise inference. It is important to point out that we exclude
geographic variables such as exemptions from the scoring model solely for
the sake of realism; it is not hard to see that allowing exemptions to feature
in the scores explicitly would only stregthen our results.
In the following sections we will ﬁrst calculate the eﬀect of period-0 be-
havior on future credit scores and then go on to examine the implications of
13In practice it is the logarithm of the score that is related to the estimated repayment
probability.
10using these scores for (secured) mortgage lending.
B Unsecured Credit and Credit Scores
Consider the following very simple extension of our basic model. In this
extension we will show ﬁrst of all that when individual borrowers’ default
costs are unobservable then credit scores derived from past borrower behavior
are useful for predicting their future risk of default on unsecured loans. In
addition, we will demonstrate that future default risk is higher — and hence
credit scores are lower on average — in states with generous bankruptcy
exemptions, even when the exemptions are not explicitly incorporated in the
scoring model. In the following section we will apply these scores to secured
credit such as mortgages.
Suppose there is a measure 1 of borrowers, each with a ﬁxed default
cost K (which only he observes), and suppose that these costs are uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. Let half the population be permanently located in a
high-exemption state with E = 1, and the other half live in a low-exemption
state with E =0 . 14 Suppose that in each period an agent receives — and
must repay — a new unsecured loan of D =1 /2, and that in each period
an individual subsequently receives an iid draw of an asset value A, which is
uniformly distributed on [0,1].
Consider the situation in period 0, when borrowers have no credit history.
These borrowers default when max[0,A 0 − E]+K<D , where A0 is this
agent’s draw of the asset value in period 0. If E = 0, a borrower defaults
when A0+K<1/2. The ex-ante probability of period-0 default in this state
14See Elul and Subramanian [20] for evidence on the impact of bankruptcy laws on
migration.






By contrast, in the state with E = 1, the asset value is irrelevant (because
it is always fully exempt), and a borrower defaults if and only if K<1/2;
as a result, the default probability is
R 1/2
0 dK =1 /2.
Averaging over both states, then, the default rate is 1/2×1/8+1/2×1/2=
5/16. Given that initially we have no information about these borrowers, the
ex-ante credit score in period 0 must be the same for each. As discussed
above, we do not condition on E, in keeping with industry practice. In this
case the period-0 score is S0 =1 −5/16 = 11/16; this is simply the probability
that a generic borrower would not default in period 0. Notice that by not
conditioning on the state exemption, we of course overestimate the risk of
default for those in the low-exemption state (their conditional probability
is actually 1/8) and underestimate it for those in the high-exemption state
(their risk is 1/2). This is reminiscent of the empirical results of Gross and
Souleles [21] and Avery et al. [22], who ﬁnd that the predictive power of
credit scores can be improved if one also accounts for “situational factors,”
such as regional recessions.
Now consider the situation one period later (period 1). At this point
the bureau can update a borrower’s score in light of his observed period-
0 repayment history. Since borrowers’ personal default costs are the same
across periods, their behavior in the two periods will also be correlated,
and thus lenders can use information about a borrower’s period-0 repayment
history to determine whether or not this borrower will default in the following
period.15
15The reader may be concerned that a borrower can only receive a chapter-7 discharge
of debts once every seven years, and so could not default in the future after have defaulted
12First, consider those who defaulted in period 0. From above, we can
deduce that
1/2×1/2
5/16 =4 /5 are from the high-exemption state, and
1/2×1/8
5/16 =
1/5 are from the state with E = 0. Now, we know that borrowers from the
E = 1 state default (in general) if and only if K<1/2. Moreover, if this is
the case in period 0, it will continue to be satisﬁed in period 1, and so those
living in E = 1 and who defaulted in period 0 will do so in period 1 as well
(if the loan is unsecured).
For those living in the low-exemption state, we can use Bayes’ Rule to
calculate the probability that they will default again in period 1, conditional




Now, we know that for these agents the probability of their defaulting in
period 0 is Prob(Default0)= 1/8. In addition, we can also calculate the









So the conditional probability of these agents defaulting in period 1 after
having defaulted in period 0 is
1/24
1/8 =1 /3.
Finally, we combine these two states together. Since 1/5 of the defaulters
were from the low-exemption state and 4/5 from the high-exemption state,
the probability of a generic period-0 defaulter defaulting again in period 1
must be 1/5 × 1/3+4 /5 × 1=1 3 /15. So for those who defaulted in period
0, their credit score in period 1 will be S1 =1− 13/15 = 2/15.
Similar arguments tell us that those living in the high-exemption state
in the recent past, but this is not a problem once one thinks of default more broadly as a
general failure to repay a loan in a timely fashion as agreed; as discussed below, this sort
of “informal” default has also been found to be related to exemptions.
13who did not default in period 0 will also not default in period 1. And an-
other application of Bayes’ Rule also tells us that those living in the low-
exemption state who did not default in period 0 will also repay in period 1
with 17/21 probability. Since of those who did not default 7/11 are from
the low exemption state and 4/11 are from the high-exemption state,16 the
overall probability of their not defaulting in period 1 having already repaid
in period 0 is S1 =7 /11 × 17/21 + 4/11 × 1=2 9 /33.
Although the updated score does not explicitly make use of the exemp-
tions (and, indeed, it still underestimates the risk of default for those in
high-exemption states) it is nevertheless the case that those living in high-
exemption states will have lower scores, on average, simply by virtue of their
having a higher risk of defaulting in period 0. To see this, recall that 1/8
of those in the low-exemption state defaulted in period 0, so the average
period-1 score in this state will be 1/8 × 2/15 + 7/8 × 29/33 ≈ 0.786. By
contrast, 1/2 of those living in the E = 1 state default in period 0, so their
average period-1 score will be 1/2 × 2/15 + 1/2 × 29/33 ≈ 0.506.
C Implications for Secured Lending
We now turn our attention to secured credit. Suppose that the loan (of
D =1 /2) to be made in period 1 is actually secured by the asset A — e.g.,
a mortgage on a house. In this case exemptions no longer apply, and default
occurs when A + K<D .17
We documented above that industry practice involves treating credit
scores in a standardized fashion, without controlling for the state exemptions.
16To see this, recall that 11/16 of the population does not default in period 0. In
addition, we know that half of the population lives in the high-exemption state and that
they default with 50% probability, so
1/2×1/2
11/16 =4 /11 of those who did not default in
period 0 must be from the high-exemption state.
17Assuming for simplicity that deﬁciency judgments are either prohibited or more gen-
erally not pursued.
14Suppose that – consistent with this practice — lenders apply a standardized
rule in which they reject all applications with credit scores below a certain
cutoﬀ ¯ S. In practice this might be a FICO score of 620. Then an econome-
trician who estimates the likelihood of credit denial — while controlling for
credit scores (S1) — would ﬁnd that while credit scores are signiﬁcant, ex-
emptions would naturally be irrelevant. We will conﬁrm this in our empirical
work below.
We can also consider what happens if the econometrician ignores credit
scores altogether and simply regresses the denial probability on the appli-
cant’s state exemption; such a procedure reﬂects the statistical models of
LW and BH. Then he would ﬁnd that exemptions appear to be signiﬁcant,
even though we know that lenders do not make use of exemptions. The
reason is that — as we have shown above — credit scores and exemptions
are correlated, with those living in the high-exemption state having lower
credit scores on average (because of the eﬀect of exemptions on default on
unsecured credit). We will verify this empirically below; also note that this
is consistent with the results of LW.
The last statement above applies directly to the case of a ﬁrst-time home
buyer, whose credit score is determined solely by his performance on unse-
cured credit. However, to the extent that applicants’ credit ﬁles reﬂect some
experience with unsecured credit, exemptions will continue to appear signif-
icant when one ignores credit scores. So in practice we should expect our
conclusion to apply more generally.
In short, if lenders use a standardized set of rules along the lines we
have described to evaluate borrower creditworthiness, we should not expect
to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of exemptions on the likelihood that a mortgage
application is rejected. Furthermore, if one does not control for the credit
score in estimating the determinants of an application’s being rejected, then
it will appear as if exemptions are signiﬁcant.
15We have focused our analysis on exemptions, but an analogous argument
may be made for the eﬀect of a past bankruptcy ﬁling on the approval of a
mortgage application. Since a bankruptcy ﬁling reﬂects not just evidence of
a borrower’s type but also a response to the legal environment in which the
applicant ﬁnds himself, to the extent that other legal variables do not aﬀect
secured credit, it can also be argued that the credit score may prove to be
a somewhat misleading indicator of mortgage default. For example, certain
areas may have a “local legal culture” that looks more or less favorably upon
bankruptcy (see Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook [23]), and this will aﬀect
the borrower’s credit score, but it should have no eﬀect on the likelihood of
mortgage default. Thus, again, when one controls for the score, we should
observe that the state bankruptcy rate, say, becomes insigniﬁcant or even
negative.
This section has discussed the implications of our model when lenders use
a standardized policy which treats credit scores uniformly across states. We
argued that this is consistent with GSE practice, and likelydriven by political
sensitivities which would make their favoring one state over another diﬃcult.
This is the model which is tested in the following section. In the appendix,
however, we treat the case of unconstrained lenders who can freely optimize;
as we argue there, the basic thrust of our analysis will remain unchanged.
III Data
We consider a sample of about one million randomly selected applications for
conventional mortgages on single-family, owner-occupied properties, drawn
from the 1999 HMDA data set. We have data on the loan amount, geographic
information to the census-tract level, and some demographic information on
the borrower (income, race, and sex). We also add macroeconomic variables
at the state, county, and census-tract levels, which we collected from various
16sources (such as bankruptcy rates, house prices, and unemployment rates).
We also include legal variables obtained from several sources. The 1998
exemptions are taken from Elias, Renauer, and Leonard [24] (we code an
unlimited exemption at $1m following BH), and the state laws governing
deﬁciency judgments were generously provided by Karen Pence [13].18 These
variables are summarized in Table 1.
We also have information on borrower creditworthiness from two sources.
First, we have a sample of approximately 150,000 credit bureau ﬁles that
were randomly drawn from a national credit bureau’s ﬁles in mid-1999. Each
ﬁle has a credit risk score associated with it. These scores range from 300
to 850 and are designed to track the common FICO score; they rank order
the borrowers (from worst to best) in terms of their likelihood of repaying a
generic credit obligation as agreed.19 The reader should note that these are
the actual credit scores which would be available to mortgage lenders. From
this ﬁle we compute the average credit score by state.
We have argued that scores and exemptions should be (inversely) corre-
lated, and our model also has this prediction. Although we cannot provide
detailed information on the credit scores because of the proprietary nature
of the data, we have veriﬁed this correlation in two ways. First of all, we
can report that the correlation coeﬃcient between scores and exemptions is
approximately -0.30 (for both property and homestead exemptions). In ad-
dition, we have determined that approximately 10 points of the range (670–
720) in average state scores is explained by diﬀerences in exemptions; that
is, moving from the lowest to the highest exemption state would lower scores
by 10 points, on average. The remainder of the diﬀerence is presumably due
18There are other state laws that govern the rights of mortgage borrowers and lenders
— see Pence [13] and Schill [25].
19The ranking is also cardinal in that the log of the likelihood of defaulting on an
obligation is approximately linear in the score at any point in time; see, for example,
Musto and Souleles [26].
17to regional economic diﬀerences (see Avery et al. [22] for more on this issue.)
In light of previous work, this correlation is not surprising. First, exemptions
may aﬀect scores because they make a formal bankruptcy more or less attrac-
tive (see Fay, Hurst, and White [8] for empirical veriﬁcation). In addition, it
has also been found that they inﬂuence “informal bankruptcy,” that is, the
failure to repay an obligation even without formally ﬁling for bankruptcy (see
Dawsey and Ausubel, [27]): The reasons for this are (1) that even outside of
bankruptcy, exemptions can preclude the seizure of property (Berkowitz and
Hynes [1]) and (2) that exemptions aﬀect the “outside option” available to
creditors and debtors.
Parenthetically, another interesting ﬁnding that arises from an analysis of
the credit bureau data is that a high homestead exemption lowers the score
only for those who actually have a mortgage recorded in their credit bureau
ﬁle (and thus are presumed to be homeowners); for those who never had
a mortgage recorded, the homestead exemption is statistically insigniﬁcant
(and, in fact, its coeﬃcient is positive!).20 That is, not only do exemptions
lower scores but the diﬀerent types of exemption aﬀect scores precisely in
the manner expected (i.e., non-homeowners do not care about homestead
exemptions).
In addition, to conﬁrm the robustness of our results we supplemented
these state-averaged scores with county-level aggregates (for the 4th quarter
of 1998). Since our sample of credit bureau ﬁles was too small to generate
reliable county-level averages for many counties, we obtained these scores
from the TrenData database.21 The score provided by the TrenData database
20Some of those who have no mortgage recorded may well still own homes either because
they paid oﬀ their mortgage in the distant past (although records go back quite a few
years) or else the lender failed to report the mortgage. By comparing the bureau ﬁles with
the PSID asset and liability data, we estimate that approximately 1/3 of those with no
mortgage recorded in their bureau ﬁles do, in fact, own homes.
21TrenData is a product of TransUnion, one of the three major U.S. credit bureaus. The
database is based on a series of large random samples of U.S. consumer credit histories
18is constructed in the same manner as most industry standard credit scores.
The other advantage to this data is that it is available for public purchase,
which would allow at least these results to be replicated.
IV Empirical Results
A Estimation and Results
In light of our model and the data we have available, we consider the following
speciﬁcation for the probability of denial of a mortgage loan for applicant i





where Xij is a vector of individual and regional variables, Sj is the average
credit score in the applicant’s state of residence, and Ej is a vector consisting
of the exemptions (property and homestead) in the state of residence.
Our model predicts that we should have γ<0 (i.e. a high average credit
score makes denial less likely) and that δ = 0 (exemptions irrelevant).
We ﬁt a linear probability model of mortgage denial; the results can be
found in the ﬁrst columns of Table 2.22 Aside from the credit score, which
we have added, most of our variables are the same as those of LW; however,
another additional variable is the percentage increase in property values since
1990 (included since it is used by the GSEs). We have reported Huber-White
robust standard errors, with clustering at the state level.
drawn quarterly since 1992. From this underlying sample, variables are constructed de-
scribing various borrowing and payment attributes of consumers, aggregated to the county
level.
22We also reran these estimations using a probit model and obtained nearly identical
results, which are not reported.
19Our results support our model. First, the coeﬃcient on the credit score
is statistically signiﬁcant. To gauge its economic signiﬁcance, observe that
its value of 0.0038 implies that a 45-point drop in the score from 695 (the
national average) to a value of 650 (seen by Fannie Mae as “high-risk”) would
nearly double the probability of denial from 18% to 35%, which seems both
substantial and also in line with actual credit market practice. Turning to
the exemptions, their coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant, precisely as our model
predicts (and, in fact, the real property exemption’s coeﬃcient is negative,
albeit insigniﬁcant). Other variables generally have the expected signs; to
single out just a few: a state prohibition on deﬁciency judgments makes it
harder to obtain a loan, and a high LTI (loan-to-income ratio) is associated
with a more successful application (this suggests that LTI is endogenous, as
many have argued). Recent increases in housing prices make it harder to
obtain a loan (holding the house price constant), which is consistent with
a model in which lenders demand some level of LTI or LTV, but a rapidly
increasing house price makes it harder to qualify; high house prices are asso-
ciated with lower denial rates (perhaps because house prices are correlated
with income and wealth). Finally, note that the state bankruptcy rate is
negative (and statistically signiﬁcant); this may appear surprising, but recall
that bankruptcies also lower scores; so this result may simply reﬂect mort-
gage lenders downweighting bankruptcies relative to the weight they have
in the credit score. This would be consistent with what we described as
“optimizing behavior” in our discussion of the model.
We also consider several alternative speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst drop the loan-
to-income dummy, since it has been observed that loan amount may well be
endogenous. A more complete treatment of this would involve estimating a
model of the joint decision of loan size and acceptance; this issue is discussed
in greater detail by Ross and Yinger [14]. We also consider the polar opposite
and add more variables: an imputed LTV (loan-to-value ratio) based on the
20OFHEO index23 and loan amount. The results are qualitatively similar in
all of these speciﬁcations and are also reported below.




This is the speciﬁcation considered by both LW and BH.
Examining the results in Table 3, we observe ﬁrst of all that they are
consistent with those of LW, in that high exemptions are associated with
a higher likelihood of being denied a mortgage (but they do not support
BH). It is important to recall, however, that according to our model, LW’s
estimates do not reﬂect the direct use of exemptions by lenders, but rather
the correlation between credit scores and exemptions. Also recall that in the
empirical estimation of our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, including the credit score led
the exemptions to be insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients generally have the same
magnitude as LW. For example, moving from the lowest to highest exemp-
tion state results in an increase in the denial probability of approximately 3
percentage points (300 basis points); this is comparable to LW’s ﬁndings.
As we mentioned earlier, to conﬁrm the robustness of our results, we
also reran our baseline estimations using county-level average scores as pro-
vided by the TransUnion TrenData database. The results, reported in Ta-
ble 4, are consistent with those obtained using state-level data on scores.
Once again, the inclusion of the credit bureau score causes the coeﬃcients on
the bankruptcy exemptions to become statistically insigniﬁcant (and much
smaller in magnitude, although the property exemption no longer changes
sign).
Our empirical results conﬁrm that exemptions do not appear to play a sig-
niﬁcant role in the underwriting decision. They are consistent both with our
23Since the 1999 HMDA data did not include information on house price.
21model and with our description of prevailing industry practice. In addition,
we have also demonstrated that some of the previous work may have found
signiﬁcant results because they did not control for borrower creditworthiness.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that we are not deﬁnitively ruling out
either that generous exemptions may slightly increase the cost of foreclosure,
nor that they may conversely make it somewhat easier for borrowers to retain
their homes in the event of ﬁnancial distress; indeed, there is some evidence
(in work cited above) that both of these eﬀects are occasionally present.
V Conclusion
We have developed a model of mortgage underwriting, in which lenders use
credit bureau scores in a standardized fashion, to predict the risk of default of
a given applicant. We merge credit scores from a sample of credit bureau ﬁles
with the HMDA data and estimate our model; this allows us to determine
the contribution of credit scores to the risk of being denied a mortgage.
We also show that our model has implications for the debate on the eﬀect
of personal bankruptcy exemptions on secured lending. Recent literature
(Berkowitz and Hynes [1], Lin and White [2]) has developed conﬂicting the-
ories — and found conﬂicting results — seeking to explain how exemptions
aﬀect the mortgage market. By contrast, our model implies that exemptions
should actually be irrelevant to the credit-granting decision. Moreover, we
show that by not controlling for borrower credit quality, the recent literature
may ﬁnd that exemptions appear to be signiﬁcant. But once one controls for
credit scores, then exemptions have no eﬀect on the likelihood that a mort-
gage application is approved; this is due to the correlation between scores
and exemptions. We verify both of these predictions.
By way of conclusion, we venture that this phenomenon may well be more
general. Using generic credit scores for mortgage lending allowed bankruptcy
22law to aﬀect the mortgage market. Similarly, the increasing popularity of
credit scores in other applications, such as employment and insurance, may
allow seemingly irrelevant credit-related factors to impact these decisions as
well. This highlights the advantages of market-speciﬁc “customized” scores,
which use only variables deemed “relevant” to the decision at hand. More
generally, it suggests a slightly cautious approach to the current rapid ex-
pansion of credit scoring.
References
[1] J. Berkowitz, R. Hynes, Bankruptcy exemptions and the market for
mortgage loans, Journal of Law and Economics 42 (2) (1999) 809–
830.
[2] Y. Lin, M. White, Bankruptcy and the market for mortgage and home
improvement loans, Journal of Urban Economics 50 (1) (2001) 138–
162.
[3] K. Temkin, R. Quercia, G. Galster, S. O’Leary, A study of the GSEs’
single family underwriting guidelines, Final report, U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (April 1999).
[4] J. W. Straka, A shift in the mortgage landscape: The 1990s move to
automated credit evaluations, Journal of Housing Research 11 (2)
(2000) 207–232.
[5] A. H. Munnell, G. M. Tootell, L. E. Browne, J. McEneaney, Mortgage
lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA data, American Economic
Review 86 (1) (1996) 25–53.
[6] I. Barakova, R. W. Bostic, P. S. Calem, S. M. Wachter, Does credit
quality matter for homeownership?, Journal of Housing Economics
12 (4) (2003) 318–336.
23[7] A. Pennington-Cross, J. Nichols, Credit history and the FHA-
conventional choice, Real Estate Economics 28 (2) (2000) 307–336.
[8] S. Fay, E. Hurst, M. J. White, The household bankruptcy decision: Does
stigma matter?, American Economic Review 92 (3) (2002) 706–718.
[9] K. Kowalewski, Personal bankruptcy: A literature review, CBO Paper,
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (September 2000).
[10] R. Gropp, J. K. Scholz, M. J. White, Personal bankruptcy and credit
supply and demand, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1) (1997)
217–251.
[11] B. W. Ambrose, C. A. Capone, Modeling the conditional probability of
foreclosure in the context of single-family mortgage default resolu-
tions, Real Estate Economics 26 (3) (1998) 391–429.
[12] T. M. Springer, N. G. Waller, Lender forebearance: Evidence from
mortgage delinquency patterns, American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association Journal 21 (1) (1993) 7–46.
[13] K. Pence, Foreclosing on opportunity: State laws and mortgage credit,
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-16, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, forthcoming: Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics (2003).
[14] S. L. Ross, J. Yinger, The Color of Credit, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2002.
[15] P. Dubey, J. Geanakoplos, M. Shubik, Default and eﬃciency in a gen-
eral equilibrium model with incomplete markets, Cowles Foundation
Discussion Paper 879R, Yale University (1989).
[16] P. Dubey, J. Geanakoplos, M. Shubik, Default and punishment in gen-
eral equilibrium, Econometrica 73 (1) (2005) 1–37.
24[17] J. K. Brueckner, Mortgage default with asymmetric information, Jour-
nal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 20 (3) (2000) 251–274.
[18] R. Elul, Collateral, credit–history, and the ﬁnancial decelerator, Work-
ing Paper 05-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2005).
[19] Fair Isaac Corporation, myFICO - What’s not in your score,
<http://www.myﬁco.com/myFICO/CreditCentral/ ScoringWorks/
FICOIgnores.asp> (November 2003).
[20] R. Elul, N. Subramanian, Forum shopping and personal bankruptcy,
Journal of Financial Services Research 21 (3) (2002) 233–255.
[21] D. B. Gross, N. S. Souleles, An empirical analysis of personal bankruptcy
and delinquency, Review of Financial Studies 15 (1) (2002) 319–347.
[22] R. B. Avery, P. S. Calem, G. B. Canner, Consumer credit scoring: Do
situational circumstances matter?, Journal of Banking and Finance
28 (4) (2004) 835–856.
[23] T. A. Sullivan, E. Warren, J. L. Westbrook, Consumer bankruptcy in
the United States: A study of alleged abuse and of local legal culture,
Journal of Consumer Policy 20 (2) (1997) 223–268.
[24] S. Elias, A. Renauer, R. Leonard, How to File for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy,
8th Edition, Nolo Press, Berkeley, CA, 1999.
[25] M. H. Schill, An economic analysis of mortgagor protection laws, Vir-
ginia Law Review 77 (1991) 489–538.
[26] D. Musto, N. Souleles, A portfolio view of consumer credit, presentation:
Conference on Retail Credit Risk Management and Measurement,
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank (April 2003).
[27] A. E. Dawsey, L. Ausubel, Informal bankruptcy, unpublished
manuscript: Department of Economics, Universityof Maryland (Jan-
uary 2001).
25Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
Denied Mortgage 0.188
Average Credit Score in State 697
State Homestead Exemption ($) 217,177
Personal Prop. Exemption ($) 10,152
Deﬁciency Judgment Prohibited 0.239
State Bankruptcy Rate (1998) 0.015
Applicant Income ($) 72,026
LTI ≥3 Dummy 0.138
Loan Amount ($) 126,292
Loan-to-Value (LTV) 0.879
Minority Applicant Dummy Var. 0.137
Single Applicant Dummy 0.485
Female Applicant Dummy 0.197
County Unemp. Rate (%, 1998) 3.486
Change in County Income ($ increase over prev. yr) 1,836
Median 1990 Tract House Price ($) 17,553
MSA House Price Appreciation (TRR, 1990-1998) 0.262
Minority Population - % of Tract 17.6
26VI Appendix - Optimal Lending Policies
In the body of the paper we explored a model in which lenders were assumed
not to make explicit use of exemptions. We justiﬁed this on the basis of
documented GSE policies, which we suggested were themselves driven either
by political considerations or else designed to impose standardization on the
mortgage market so as to facilitate securitization. This model had empirical
predictions which we veriﬁed using our data; it also suggested an explanation
of at least some of the previous literature’s ﬁndings.
In this section we examine what mortgage lenders’ optimal policy might
be in the context of our model, with particular reference to the role of ex-
emptions. We will see that not only do high exemptions not increase the risk
of mortgage default (just as derived above), but in fact they would actually
make a borrower more attractive to lenders, ceteris paribus. One intuitive
way to see this is to note that an agent from a high-exemption state who did
not default in the initial period must be of very good quality, since in this
state default on unsecured loans is relatively attractive.
To begin, it is necessary to specify an objective function for the lenders.
Suppose, for example, that mortgage lenders would like to maximize lend-
ing, subject to the constraint that the average default rate on their mortgage
loans does not exceed 15%. This is fairly reasonable as a rough, qualitative
description of GSE policy, although in practice other considerations will of
course apply. The maximal default rate of 15% is adopted purely for expo-
sitional convenience and has no empirical signiﬁcance.
Suppose once again that we are standing in period 1, having observed an
applicant’s repayment history in period 0. We ﬁrst show that lenders will
always want to oﬀer mortgages to all those who do not default in period 0.
The diﬀerence with the analysis in the body of the paper, however, is that
now lenders are free to condition on the exemption in force in the borrower’s
27state of residence. Now, for those who did not default in period 0 and live
in the E = 1 state, we know that they will necessarily have K ≥ 1/2, and
they will also never default on the mortgage (just as for an unsecured loan);
in this case lending to them is a trivial decision. Now, for those living in
the E = 0 state, secured and unsecured loans are equivalent, and so their
probability of not defaulting is the same as if the loan were unsecured, i.e.,
17/21. Suppose that we lend to these agents as well. It will be useful to
recall from above that the set of non-defaulting agents has measure 11/16.
Furthermore, since for both of these classes of non-defaulting agents their
behavior is independent of whether or not a loan is secured, we can apply
our earlier results on unsecured loans and deduce that the overall expected
default rate on the mortgages to this pool of agents who did not default in the
past will be 4/33. Since this is less than 15%, and since we will show below
that even the agents from the low-exemption state who do not default are
less risky than any agents who did default (regardless of the latter’s state),
lending to these agents is both feasible and optimal..
Now by contrast consider those who defaulted in period 0. We have
already seen that these make up 5/16 of the initial pool of borrowers. Of
these, 1/5 live in the E = 0 state and 4/5 in the E = 1 state. For those
who live in the E = 0 state, unsecured and secured credit are the same, as
we have already pointed out, and so, from above, their conditional default
rate on the mortgage will be 1/3. By contrast, those who live in the E =1
state will be less likely to default on the mortgage than on unsecured credit
(in period 1), since exemptions do not apply to the mortgage. In particular,








of defaulting on the mortgage in period 1 (by contrast, they would default
28for certain on an unsecured loan, since their assets would always be exempt
in this state).
Now consider the following lender policy. Suppose that the lender oﬀers
mortgages to all those who did not default in period 0, as we have argued is
indeed optimal above. For those who defaulted in period 0, he randomizes. In
particular, for defaulters from the low-exemption state he oﬀers mortgages
with probability π0, and for those who defaulted but are from the high-
exemption state, he oﬀers mortgages with probability π1. Then the total
measure of agents receiving mortgages in period 1 would be:
11/16 + π0 × (5/16 × 1/5) + π1 × (5/16 × 4/5) =
11 + π0 +4 π1
16





The conditional probability of default on the lender’s entire portfolio can be
obtained by dividing these terms. It is:
4+π0 +3 π1
33 + 3π0 +1 2 π1
.
Now, if lenders are free to condition their decision in this fashion then it
is not hard to see that the optimal policy — i.e. the one which maximizes
lending subject to the constraint that the portfolio default rate not exceed
15% — is to set π0 = 0; to keep the default rate no higher than 15%, we
would thus need to choose π1 =0 .79. This would make the total volume of
lending equal to 0.885. Notice that this optimal policy actually treats those
who default in the low-exemption state much more harshly. The intuition
is that those who defaulted in the high-exemption state should be treated
more leniently in the mortgage market because their prior default can be
29ascribed to its generous exemptions, which do not apply to mortgages (this
striking diﬀerence in policies suggests that the political economy argument
for uniform criteria may well have some merit).
By contrast, suppose lenders are limited to a uniform policy which does
not condition on exemptions; recall that we suggested that this is indeed a
realistic description of industry practice. In our context this means that they
are constrained to set π0 = π1. It is now the case that π0 = π1 cannot exceed
0.54. At this level, the measure of those who receive loans is 0.857. Observe
that the more uniform policy results in a lower level of lending.
Notice that — at ﬁrst blush — a rule that ignores exemptions does not ap-
pear to be optimal for the lender (nor for society). We have already ventured,
however, that lenders – and in particular GSEs — may nevertheless be opti-
mizing in not conditioning their criteria explicitly on exemptions, when one
takes into account their political constraints as well as the necessities born
of securitization. Of course, this still leaves open the question of whether a
uniform policy is indeed socially optimal.
Finally, we can also sketch the implications of this analysis for the em-
pirical data. Notice that, conditional on credit score, high exemptions would
actually make an applicant more attractive and therefore less likely to be de-
nied a mortgage. However, if one did not control for scores, then exemptions
should appear to be irrelevant to the lending decision.
30Table 2: Denial of Mortgage Applications - Including Score
Average Credit Score in State -0.0038∗∗ -0.0038∗∗ -0.0038∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
State Homestead Exemption 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012
($100,000) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Personal Prop. Exemption -0.0639 -0.0704 -0.0633
($100,000) (0.0734) (0.0712) (0.0733)
Deﬁciency Judgment 0.0277∗∗ 0.0270∗∗ 0.0268∗∗
Prohibited (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
State Bankruptcy Rate (1998) -2.8693∗∗ -2.8492∗∗ -2.934∗∗
(1.477) (1.443) (1.478)
Applicant Income ($100,000) -0.0582∗∗ -0.0341∗∗ -0.0562∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0069) (0.0148)
Income2 ($100,0002) 0.0008∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
LTI ≥3 Dummy -0.0193∗∗ 0.0059
(0.0093) (0.0055)






Minority Applicant Dummy Var. 0.0708∗∗ 0.0680∗∗ 0.0707∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0090) (0.0096)
Single Applicant Dummy 0.0480∗∗ 0.0423∗∗ 0.0475∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0032)
Female Applicant Dummy 0.0011 -0.0020 0.0007
(0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0047)
County Unemp. Rate (%, 1998) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Change in County Income -0.1246∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.1253∗∗
(increase over prev. yr, $10,000) (0.0366) (0.0037) (0.0366)
Median 1990 Tract House Price -0.0290∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0305∗∗
($100,000) (0.0093) (0.0001) (0.0097)
MSA House Price Appreciation 0.0520∗∗ 0.0498∗∗ 0.0498∗∗
(TRR, 1990-1998) (0.0232) (0.0235) (0.0233)
Minority Population 0.0010∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0010∗∗
Fraction of Tract (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
R2 0.0670 0.0747 0.0667
Number of Observations = 1.15 million. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level, and ∗∗
at the 5% level. Intercept not reported. Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses
(clustered at state level) 31Table 3: Denial of Mortgage Applications - No Score
State Homestead Exemption 0.0028∗ 0.0028∗ 0.0028∗
($100,000) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Personal Prop. Exemption 0.1502∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.1524∗∗
($100,000) (0.0756) (0.0752) (0.0756)
Deﬁciency Judgment -0.0089 -0.0091 -0.0102
Prohibited (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0117)
State Bankruptcy Rate (1998) 0.7351 0.7079 0.6864
(1.6466) (1.6218) (1.6577)
Applicant Income ($10,000) -0.0578∗∗ -0.0334∗∗ -0.0556∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0066) (0.0146)
Income2 ($10,0002) 0.0008∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
LTI ≥3 Dummy -0.0221∗∗ 0.0034
(0.0095) (0.0058)






Minority Applicant Dummy Var. 0.0738∗∗ 0.0710∗∗ 0.0737∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0105)
Single Applicant Dummy 0.0495∗∗ 0.0438∗∗ 0.0490∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0438) (0.0032)
Female Applicant Dummy 0.0021 0.0011 0.0016
(0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0048)
County Unemp. Rate (%, 1998) 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Change in Median County Income -0.1204∗∗ -0.0117∗∗ -0.0121∗∗
(increase over prev. yr, $10,000) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Median 1990 Tract House Price -0.0346∗∗ -0.0427 -0.0363∗∗
($100,000) (0.0114) ( 0.0130) (0.0118)
MSA House Price Appreciation 0.0810∗∗ 0.0785∗∗ 0.0788∗∗
(TRR, 1990-1998) (0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0283)
Minority Population 0.0012∗∗ 0.0013 ∗∗ 0.0012∗∗
Fraction of Tract (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
R2 0.0607 0.0686 0.0604
Number of Observations = 1.15 million. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level, and ∗∗
at the 5% level. Intercept not reported. Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses
(clustered at state level)
32Table 4: Denial of Mortgage Applications - County-Level Scores
No Score County Score
Average Credit Score in County -0.0014∗∗
(0.0003)
State Homestead Exemption 0.0028∗ 0.0014
($100,000) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Personal Prop. Exemption 0.1502∗∗ 0.0365
($100,000) (0.0756) (0.0735)
Deﬁciency Judgment -0.0089 -0.0021
Prohibited (0.0114) (0.0098)
State Bankruptcy Rate (1998) 0.7351 -1.2680
(1.6466) (1.6306)
Applicant Income ($10,000) -0.0578∗∗ -0.0582∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0154)
Income2 ($10,0002) 0.0008∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
LTI ≥3 Dummy -0.0221∗∗ -0.0196∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0098)
Minority Applicant Dummy Var. 0.0738∗∗ 0.0698∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0098)
Single Applicant Dummy 0.0495∗∗ 0.0472∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0031)
Female Applicant Dummy 0.0021 0.0013
(0.0049) (0.0049)
County Unemp. Rate (%, 1998) 0.0013 -0.2691
(0.0024) (0.2799)
Change in Median County Income -0.1204∗∗ -0.0814∗∗
(increase over prev. yr, $10,000) (0.0045) (0.0341)
Median 1990 Tract House Price -0.0346∗∗ -0.0280∗∗
($100,000) (0.0114) (0.0109)
MSA House Price Appreciation 0.0810∗∗ 0.0795∗∗
(TRR, 1990-1998) (0.0278) (0.0259)
Minority Population 0.0012∗∗ 0.0010∗∗
Fraction of Tract (0.0002) (0.0001)
R2 0.0624 0.0646
Number of Observations = 1.15 million. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level, and ∗∗
at the 5% level. Intercept not reported. Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses
(clustered at state level)
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